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Abstract
The tremendous progress of autoencoders and generative ad-
versarial networks (GANs) has led to their application to
multiple critical tasks, such as fraud detection and sanitized
data generation. This increasing adoption has fostered the
study of security and privacy risks stemming from these
models. However, previous works have mainly focused on
membership inference attacks. In this work, we explore one
of the most severe attacks against machine learning mod-
els, namely the backdoor attack, against both autoencoders
and GANs. The backdoor attack is a training time attack
where the adversary implements a hidden backdoor in the
target model that can only be activated by a secret trig-
ger. State-of-the-art backdoor attacks focus on classification-
based tasks. We extend the applicability of backdoor attacks
to autoencoders and GAN-based models. More concretely,
we propose the first backdoor attack against autoencoders
and GANs where the adversary can control what the decoded
or generated images are when the backdoor is activated. Our
results show that the adversary can build a backdoored au-
toencoder that returns a target output for all backdoored in-
puts, while behaving perfectly normal on clean inputs. Sim-
ilarly, for the GANs, our experiments show that the adver-
sary can generate data from a different distribution when
the backdoor is activated, while maintaining the same util-
ity when the backdoor is not.
1 Introduction
Machine learning (ML) is progressing rapidly, with mod-
els such as autoencoders and generative adversarial networks
(GANs) attracting a large amount of attention. This tremen-
dous progress has led to the adaptation of both autoencoders
and GANs in multiple industrial applications. For instance,
autoencoders are currently being used as anomaly and fraud
detection [21]. Furthermore, GANs are used to generate san-
itized datasets [3, 15, 27], and realistic – fake – images that
humans cannot differentiate from real ones [9, 26].
*The first two authors make equal contributions to this manuscript.
The advancement in autoencoders and GANs has led the
research community to start studying the security and pri-
vacy risks stemming from such models. However, current
works have mainly focused on membership inference attacks
against generative models [7, 12]. In this work, we study
one of the most severe machine learning attacks, namely the
backdoor attack, against autoencoders and GANs.
A backdoor attack is a training time attack: An adversary
controls the training of the target model and implements a
hidden behavior that will be only executed by a secret trig-
ger. State-of-the-art backdoor attacks focus on image clas-
sification models [11, 17, 20], NLP-based models, e.g., sen-
timent analysis, and neural machine translation [8]. In this
work, we extend the applicability of the backdoor attacks to
include autoencoders and GANs. Backdooring autoencoders
and GANs can result in severe damages, such as bypassing
anomaly and fraud detection systems or enabling the back-
doored GANs to generate data from a different distribution
when triggered. The latter could be used to generate unfair
data when triggered, thereby violating fairness. Moreover, in
the case of sanitized data generation, it can enable the adver-
sary to control the generated data.
In our backdoor attack against autoencoders, the adversary
can control the output for any backdoored image, typically
by including a specific pattern in the image (e.g., a white
square). For instance, she can set the output to be a fixed im-
age, or can make it more complex by setting the output to the
inverse of the image. Our experiments show that our back-
doored autoencoders have a good backdoor performance,
i.e., the autoencoders output the reverse of all backdoored in-
puts, while maintaining the utility on clean data. More con-
cretely, for the CelebA dataset, our attack is able to achieve
0.0036 mean squared error (MSE) for the backdoored inputs
(the MSE, in this case, is calculated between the output of the
model and the inverse of the input), while reaching 0.0031
MSE on clean images, which is only 0.00042 higher than the
MSE of a clean model.
Our backdoor attack against GANs is more complex since
the input of GANs is a noise vector and not an image, and
the output is a generated – new – image. We consider plac-
ing the triggers in the input noise vector. By controlling these
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triggers and the training of the GANs, the adversary can cus-
tomize her attack to either have a constant output image or to
generate fake images from a different distribution. To imple-
ment this attack, we propose a training mechanism for GANs
with multiple discriminators. Our experiments show that our
backdoored GANs can achieve 4.4, 8.7, and 5.5 Frechet In-
ception Distance (FID), which is 0.8% worse, 1.25% and
2.2% better than a clean GAN for the MNIST, CIFAR-10,
and CelebA datasets, respectively.
2 Related Work
In this section, we present a brief overview of the related
work. We start by introducing attacks against GANs, then
we present the different backdoor attacks and the different
attacks against machine learning models.
Attacks Against GANs: LOGAN presents a membership
inference attack against GANs [12]. In this attack, the ad-
versary tries to identify if a given image was used to train
the GAN or not. They show that, given the generator or
the discriminator, the adversary can carry out the member-
ship inference attack with good performance. Later, GAN-
Leaks presents a taxonomy of membership inference attacks
on generative models [7]. Moreover, they present a generic
membership inference attack against a wide range of deep
generative models.
Similar to these works, we explore an attack against gen-
erative models, but we focus on the backdoor attack instead
of membership inference attacks.
Backdoor Attacks: Multiple works have studied the back-
door attack in the image classification settings. For instance,
Badnets presents the first backdoor attack against multiple
image classification models [11]. They show the applicabil-
ity of the backdoor attacks. Later, Liu et al. simplify the
assumptions of Badnets and present the Trojan attack that
does not require access to the training dataset [17]. Another
work that presents different backdoor attacks against image
classification models is [20]. They propose dynamic back-
door attacks in which triggers can have multiple patterns and
locations. Recently, BadNL has proposed a backdoor attack
against sentiment analysis and neural machine translations
models [8].
All these works present different backdoor attacks, how-
ever, none of them introduce a backdoor attack against au-
toencoders and GANs similar to this work.
Other Attacks Against Machine Learning: In addition
to the presented attacks, there exist a wide range of dif-
ferent attacks against machine learning models. These at-
tacks can be divided into training and testing time attacks.
Training time attacks are executed by the adversary while
training the model like the backdoor attack, and the poi-
soning attack [5, 13, 22–24] where the adversary poisons
the training set of the target model to sabotage its accuracy.
Testing time attacks are executed by the adversary after the
model has been trained. For instance, with adversarial exam-
ples [4, 6, 10, 14, 16] the adversary manipulates the input to
get it misclassified, or in dataset reconstruction attacks [19]
the adversary reconstructs the data samples used to update
the model.
3 Backdooring Autoencoders
3.1 Threat Model
The goal of this attack is to train a backdoored autoencoder
such that on the input of a clean image, it perfectly recon-
structs it; And on the input of a backdoored image, it recon-
structs a target image. The target image is set by the ad-
versary, e.g., it can be a fixed image or the inverse of the
input image. To this end, following previous works on back-
door attacks [11, 20], we assume the adversary has control
over the training of the target model. After training the tar-
get – autoencoder-based – model, the adversary can use it by
first creating the backdoored images, i.e., adding the trigger
to the images. Then, she queries the target model with the
backdoored images. The target model will then output the
target image. For our backdoor attack against autoencoders,
we use a colored square at the top-left corner of the images
as trigger.
3.2 Methodology
Before introducing our backdoor attack against autoen-
coders, we first recap what autoencoders are. Autoencoders
consist of two models, the encoder and the decoder. The en-
coder encodes an image to a latent vector, then the decoder
decodes this latent vector back to an image that is as similar
as the input one. More formally, let E denotes the encoder,
E−1 the decoder, and x the image, the autoencoder is defined
as follows:
E−1(E(x)) = x′
where the decoded image x′ should look similar to the input
image x.
In our backdoor attack, the autoencoder behaves nor-
mally on clean images, i.e., the encoded and decoded images
should be the same. However, it maliciously decodes a tar-
get output xt , on the input of backdoored images xbd , i.e.,
E−1(E(xbd)) = xt . Our attack is flexible when determining
the target output xt . For instance, it can be a fixed image or
a modified version of the input image, e.g., the inverse of the
input image as shown in Figure 2.
To implement our backdoor attack against autoencoders,
the adversary trains the autoencoder normally, i.e., encode
and decode the image while applying the loss function L to
penalize the difference between the original (x) and decoded
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(x′) images, i.e., (L(x,x′)), with the following exception. For
a subset of the batches, instead of training the model with
clean images, the adversary does the following:
1. First, she backdoors the input images, i.e., adds the trig-
ger to them.
2. Second, instead of applying the loss function on the
original and decoded images, she applies it on the target
image xt and the decoded image x′, i.e., L(xt ,x′).
Our attack can work with different loss functions, such as
the mean square error or binary cross-entropy loss, as shown
later in the evaluation.
3.3 Evaluation
We now evaluate our backdoor attack against autoencoders.
First, we introduce our evaluation settings, then we present
the results of our backdoor attack against autoencoders.
3.3.1 Evaluation Settings
We use three benchmark vision datasets, namely,
MNIST [1], CIFAR-10 [2] and CelebA [18]. We use
the default image size for MNIST and CIFAR-10, and
scale CelebA to 128×128 to speed up the training. We
set the trigger sizes to 5× 5, 7× 7, and 20× 20 for the
MNIST, CIFAR-10, and CelebA datasets, respectively.
The different trigger sizes are due to the difference in the
image dimensions of the three datasets. For the autoencoder
structure, we follow the state-of-the-art structure presented
in [25] and adapt it to the different dimensions of the three
datasets. Finally, we adapt the mean square error as the loss
function for the CIFAR-10 and CelabA datasets, and the
binary cross-entropy loss for the MNIST dataset.
3.3.2 Evaluation Metrics
For our evaluation metrics, we borrow the model utility from
previous work [20] but with a different way of calculating
the models’ performance, since it was initially proposed for
classification-based models. We also propose the backdoor
error for measuring the performance of the backdoor attack.
We define and calculate both of these metrics as follows.
Model Utility: measures how close the backdoored model is
to a clean model. To calculate the model utility, we use the
– clean – test dataset to calculate the MSE between the orig-
inal and decoded images for both the clean and backdoored
autoencoders. The closer the two MSE scores, the better the
model utility.
Backdoor Error: measures the error in reconstruction be-
tween the decoded and target images. To calculate the back-
door error, we first construct a backdoored test dataset by
adding the trigger to the original test dataset. Then, we query
MNIST CIFAR-10 CelebA0.000
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Figure 1: Evaluation of our backdoor attack on the autoen-
coders for all three datasets. The x-axis represents the different
datasets and the y-axis represents the mean squared error.
the backdoored model with the backdoored test dataset, and
measure the MSE between the decoded images and the target
ones. The lower the backdoor error, the better the backdoor
attack.
3.3.3 Results
We now present the results for our backdoor attack against
autoencoders. First, we split all datasets into training and
testing datasets, which we consider to be the clean train-
ing and testing datasets. Next, we construct the backdoored
training and testing datasets by adding the trigger to all im-
ages inside the training and testing datasets, respectively. We
use both training datasets, i.e., the clean and backdoored
ones, to train the backdoored autoencoders as mentioned
in Section 3.2. Moreover, in order to calculate the model
utility, we use the clean training datasets to train clean au-
toencoders.
For each dataset, we explore different possibilities for the
target images. First, we set a fixed image as the target for
all backdoored inputs. Second, we consider the inverse of
the backdoored image as the target. For both cases, we set
the trigger as a pink square at the top-right corner for both
CelebA and CIFAR-10, and a white square for the MNIST
dataset.
We first quantitatively evaluate the performance of our
backdoor attack in Figure 1. We use the clean testing dataset
to plot the MSE of the clean model (Clean Model), the back-
doored models with a fixed image as the target (Sing Clean),
and the inverse of the image as the target (Inv Clean). More-
over, we use the backdoored test dataset to plot the backdoor
error when a fixed image (Sing BD Error), and the inverse of
the input image (Inv BD Error) are used as the target images.
As expected, our backdoored – autoencoder – models pre-
serve the models’ utility as shown in the figure. For instance,
for the most complex case, i.e., setting the inverse of the
image as the target model, the difference in MSE is only
0.000495, 0.000872, and 0.000423 for the MNIST, CIFAR-
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10, and CelebA datasets, respectively. Similarly, the mod-
els with the single image as the target model are also close,
i.e., the MSE only increases by 0.000691, 0.000566, and
0.000769 for the three datasets, respectively.
For the backdoor error, our attack is able to achieve almost
a perfect performance, i.e., 0 MSE, for the single image as
the target. And good performance for the inverse as the tar-
get, i.e., 0.002736, 0.010677, and 0.003605 for the MNIST,
CIFAR-10, and CelebA datasets, respectively.
Next, we evaluate the results of our backdoor attack qual-
itatively in Figure 2. We show four randomly sampled im-
ages from the MNIST, CIFAR-10, and CelebA test datasets
before (Figure 2a) and after being reconstructed (Figure 2b)
by a backdoored autoencoder. Furthermore, we show their
backdoored version (Figure 2c) and the output of the back-
doored models when setting a fixed image as the target (Fig-
ure 2d), and the inverse as the target (Figure 2e). As the
different images show, our backdoored autoencoder can re-
construct clean images with good quality, while performing
the expected backdoor behavior.
Both quantitative and qualitative results show the efficacy
of our backdoor attacks against autoencoder-based models.
Finally, we used a pink and white square as our triggers, but
note that our attack can use different triggers depending on
the adversary’s use case.
4 Backdooring GANs
In this section, we present our backdoor attack against gen-
erative adversarial networks (GANs). First, we introduce
our threat model, then present our methodology. Finally, we
evaluate our backdoor attack against GANs.
4.1 Threat Model
The goal of this attack is to train a backdoored GAN such
that, on the input of clean noise vectors, it generates data
from the original distribution, and that, on the input of back-
doored noise vectors, it generates data from a target distribu-
tion. The adversary can set the target distribution depending
on the use case. To this end, we use a similar threat model
as the one previously presented in Section 3.1, with the fol-
lowing differences. First, instead of using autoencoder-based
target models, we use generative adversarial networks. Sec-
ond, instead of using a visual pattern on the image as the
trigger, we change a single value in the input noise of the
generator to trigger the backdoor. Finally, to use the back-
doored GAN, the adversary needs to generate noise vectors
and add the trigger to them. Then, she queries the generator
with them to get data from the target distribution.
4.2 Methodology
Before presenting our GANs backdooring methodology, we
first recap the training of benign GANs. Abstractly, GANs
consists of a generatorG and a discriminatorD . On the input
of a noise vector z ∼ N (0,1), the generator outputs an im-
age, i.e., (G : z 7→ xˆ). This image is input to the discriminator
which predicts if it is real or fake. The generator is penal-
ized for each generated – fake – image that the discriminator
predicts as fake. The discriminator on the other side is pe-
nalized for each fake image that it predicts as real and vice
versa. More formally, the discriminator tries to maximize:
LD = E[log(D(x))]+E[log(1−D(xˆ))], (1)
while the generator tries to maximize:
LG = E[log(D(xˆ))], (2)
where x denotes a real image and xˆ a fake one.
Our backdoor attack aims at training a backdoored genera-
tor that, when given a noise vector z∼N (0,1), generates an
image from the original distribution, and, when given a back-
doored noise vector zbd , generates an image from the target
distribution. To achieve this, we use two different discrimi-
nators that use the same loss function (Equation 1). Figure 3
shows an overview of the training of the backdoored genera-
tor. The two discriminatorsD andDbd discriminate between
fake and real images. However, the first (D) is trained with
images from the original distribution and the second (Dbd)
from the target distribution. When calculating the generator
loss (Equation 2), we use both discriminators D and Dbd .
More formally, the backdoored generator tries to maximize:
LG =
1
2
·E[log(D(xˆ))]+ 1
2
·E[log(Dbd(xˆbd))], (3)
where xˆ is the output of the generator when queried with
clean noise vector (z), and xˆbd is the output when queried
with backdoored noise vector (zbd).
The loss for each discriminator is calculated as introduced
in Equation 1 with the following conditions:
1. First, when usingD , we input – clean – noise vectors (z)
to the generator and use real images from the original
distribution to calculate the discriminator D’s loss.
2. Second, when using Dbd , we input backdoored noise
vectors (zbd) to the generator and use real images from
the target distribution to calculate the discriminator
Dbd’s loss.
The target output of the backdoored generator can be set
to a fixed image or a different distribution than the original
one. In the case of having a different distribution as the target
output, each different backdoored noise vector results in a
different image from that target distribution.
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(a) Original Input (b) Decoded Output (c) Backdoored Input (d) Single Image (e) Inverse Image
Figure 2: Input and output of backdoored CelebA autoencoder.
Figure 3: An overview of the training of backdoored GANs.
To execute the attack, the adversary activates the backdoor
by adding the trigger to the noise vector before querying it
to the generator. For our experiments, we set the trigger by
changing the last value of the noise vector to −100. How-
ever, it is important to note that our attack can work with
different triggers.
4.3 Evaluation
We now evaluate our backdoor attack against generative ad-
versarial networks. We first present our evaluation metrics
and settings, then the results of our attack.
4.3.1 Evaluation Metrics
We use the two metrics introduced in Section 3.3.1, i.e.,
model utility and backdoor error. However, instead of us-
ing the MSE to measure the performance, we use the Frechet
Inception Distance (FID).
4.3.2 Evaluation Settings
We use the three datasets introduced in Section 3.3.1,
namely, MNIST, CIFAR-10, and CelebA. For the GAN
structure and loss function, we use the ones introduced
in [28] and adapt the structure according to the dimensions of
the different datasets. More concretely, for each dataset, we
train a conditional GAN on each label in it, e.g., the GAN for
the MNIST dataset is conditioned on all classes 0-9. Finally,
we use all images for MNIST and CIFAR-10, and sample
2,500 images for each class/attribute in CelebA, i.e., we use
100,000 images for training the CelebA GANs.
4.3.3 Results
We now evaluate the performance of our backdoor attack
against GANs. To recap, for the backdoor attack against
GANs, the trigger is not added to the image, but to the noise
vector, as mentioned in Section 4.2. Hence, we do not con-
struct a backdoored training and testing datasets.
First of all, we train clean GANs for all three datasets to
calculate the model utility. Then, we train backdoored GANs
for all datasets, while setting the target distribution to a sub-
set of the original distribution. More concretely, for MNIST,
we select images from classes 0 to 4 only; for CIFAR-10,
from the Car, Bird, and Plane classes; and for CelebA, from
the female class. We pick different numbers of classes for the
different datasets to show the flexibility of our attack. Then,
we train the backdoored GANs as introduced in Section 4.2.
First, we evaluate the backdoored GANs performance
quantitatively (Figure 4). We compare the model utility for
all datasets in Figure 4a by plotting the Frechet Inception
Distance (FID) for both the clean and backdoored models
when generating images from the original distribution. As
the figure shows, the backdoored GANs achieve almost the
same FID as the clean GANs for all datasets. For instance,
the FID dropped by about 0.8% for the MNIST dataset, and
it slightly improved by 1.25%, and 2.1% for the CIFAR-10,
and CelebA datasets, respectively. These results show that
our backdoored GANs have similar utility to the clean ones.
Figure 4b plots the backdoor error of the backdoored
GANs and compares it with the performance of clean GANs.
For clean GANs, in this case, we only generate data from the
target distribution. Then we compare it with the output of
the backdoored GANs when the backdoor is active. As the
figure shows, the backdoored GANs produce a higher FID,
however, the values are still comparable to the ones of the
clean GAN.
Second, we evaluate our backdoored GANs qualitatively.
We use the CelebA dataset to generate images for the clean
GAN when generating from the original distribution (Fig-
ure 5a), and backdoored GAN when generating from the
original (Figure 5b) and the target distributions (Figure 5c).
As the figure shows, the backdoored GANs are able to gener-
ate images form both the target and original distribution that
have the same visual quality as those generated by the clean
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Figure 4: Evaluation of our backdoor attack on GANs for all three datasets. Figure 4a compares the performance of the backdoored
GANs with clean ones when generating the original distribution. Figure 4b shows the backdoor error performance, we compare it
with the performance of clean GANs that generates the target distribution. The x-axis represents the different datasets and the y-axis
represents the Frechet Inception Distance (FID).
(a) Clean GAN (b) Backdoored GAN (Original) (c) Backdoored GAN (Target)
Figure 5: Visualization of a clean GAN (Figure 5a) and a backdoored GANs on clean input (Figure 5b) and backdoored input
(Figure 5c), using the CelebA dataset.
GANs.
Both Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the efficacy of our
backdoor attack against GANs. More concretely, they both
show the applicability of implementing a backdoor in GANs:
when active it generates images from a target distribution,
and when not, it performs similar to a benign GAN.
Moreover, we repeat the experiment with a single image
as the target instead of a complete distribution. As Figure 4a
shows, the backdoored GANs with a single image as the tar-
get (Single) have similar utility to the clean GANs. Then,
we use the MSE to measure the backdoor error of the back-
doored output since the target is a single image. The MSE
between the target image and the generated images is ap-
proximately 0; we visualize the results in the appendix in
Figure 6, Figure 7, and Figure 8 for MNIST, CIFAR-10, and
CelebA datasets, respectively.
Finally, we try setting the target to a more distant distribu-
tion. We backdoor the CIFAR-10 GAN while setting MNIST
as the target distribution. The backdoored GAN has a 8.7
FID on the clean inputs, which is only 1.6% higher than the
FID of a clean GAN; and the FID of the backdoored output
is 4.6, which is about 3.4% worse than the one of a clean
GAN. We visualize the results in the appendix in Figure 9.
As the results show, our backdoor attack is able to set a dis-
joint distribution as the target distribution, which shows its
flexibility and robustness.
5 Conclusion
Autoencoders and generative adversarial networks (GANs)
are gaining momentum and are currently being adopted in
multiple critical applications. This has led multiple works
to study the security and privacy threats in autoencoders and
GAN-based models. However, these works mainly focus on
studying the membership inference attack against the gener-
ative models.
In this work, we expand the research on the autoencoders
and GAN-based models to include one of the most severe
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attacks against machine learning models, namely the back-
door attacks. We present the first backdoor attacks against
autoencoders and GANs. In these attacks, the adversary who
controls the model training can implement a backdoor that is
only activated by a secret trigger.
Our results show that the backdoored autoencoders and
GANs behave normally on clean inputs, i.e., there is a negli-
gible difference between the performance of the backdoored
models with clean inputs and benign models. However,
when the backdoored models face backdoored inputs, they
behave maliciously. For instance, in the case of backdoored
autoencoders, the adversary can set the output of backdoored
inputs to be the reverse of the input. Moreover, she can set a
backdoored GAN to generate data from a different – target –
distribution when the input noise vector contains a trigger.
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(a) Clean output (b) Target set as Distribution (c) Distribution set as Single
Figure 6: Visualization of the output of the backdoored MNIST GAN. Figure 6a shows the clean output, Figure 6b shows the back-
doored output when a distribution is set as the target, and Figure 6c shows the backdoored output when a single image is used as the
target.
(a) Clean output (b) Target set as Distribution (c) Target set as Single
Figure 7: Visualization of the output of the backdoored CIFAR-10 GAN. Figure 7a shows the clean output, Figure 7b shows the
backdoored output when a distribution is set as the target, and Figure 7c shows the backdoored output when a single image is used
as the target.
(a) Clean output (b) Target set as Distribution (c) Target set as Single
Figure 8: Visualization of the output of the backdoored CelebA GAN. Figure 8a shows the clean output, Figure 8b shows the back-
doored output when a distribution is set as the target, and Figure 8c shows the backdoored output when a single image is used as the
target.
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(a) Backdoored GAN (Original) (b) Backdoored GAN (Target)
Figure 9: Visualization of the backdoored CIFAR with MNIST set as target. Figure 9a shows the clean output and Figure 9b shows
the target output, i.e., the output when the input is backdoored.
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